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Reflections on Riverisland:
Reconsideration of the Fraud Exception
to the Parol Evidence Rule
Michelle P. LaRocca
The California Supreme Court recently and unanimously overruled a longstanding
precedent regarding the fraud exception to the Parol Evidence Rule in Riverisland Cold
Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Production Credit Association. Prior to Riverisland, the
Parol Evidence Rule did not allow evidence of promissory fraud. Now, evidence of
promissory fraud at variance with the terms of the writing is admissible. Riverisland
discourages fraudulent practices and creates a clear rule that is consistent with the
language of California’s Parol Evidence Rule. It also recognizes the reality that many
people do not read or understand the contracts that they sign and the psychological biases
that play a role in perception and decisionmaking. The new precedent, however, exposes
drafting parties to both intentionally and unintentionally fabricated claims from nondrafting parties. Drafting parties are also at risk of unpredictable outcomes from juries
who might be swayed by testimony of alleged fraudulent promises. Because the new
standard favors non-drafting parties, the cost of contracting has shifted from non-drafting
parties to drafting parties.
This Note suggests that, to balance the costs of contracting between drafting and nondrafting parties, meaningful assent to the specific terms at issue should be required for a
party to be able to exclude evidence of alleged promissory fraud. Meaningful assent could
be accomplished by having a one-page summary and disclaimer as to the key terms of the
contract. If this summary/disclaimer page succeeds in being short, simple, and specific,
then California courts should find mutual assent as to a contract’s terms and specific
disclaimers, and preclude evidence of promissory fraud that is at variance with those terms.



J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2014. I would like to
thank Professor Harry G. Prince for his suggestion of this topic and guidance throughout the writing
process, Pat LaRocca for her inspiration of a practical solution, and Jim LaRocca for being my lifelong
editor and supporter. Thank you also to the editors and staff of the Hastings Law Journal for their
hard work and insightful feedback.
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Introduction
On January 14, 2013, the California Supreme Court overruled a
longstanding precedent regarding promissory fraud. In the 1935 case,
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association v. Pendergrass,
the California Supreme Court declared inadmissible evidence of
promissory fraud—a promise made without the intent to perform—made
1
prior to and inconsistent with the subsequent written agreement. The
court’s unanimous decision in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. FresnoMadera Production Credit Association overturned Pendergrass and

1. 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935).
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declared that evidence of promissory fraud that is at variance with the
2
terms of the writing is admissible.
Prior to Riverisland, Pendergrass was highly criticized and difficult
to apply. Two of the main criticisms were that the Pendergrass decision
3
was inconsistent with the Parol Evidence Rule, codified at section 1856
of the California Code of Civil Procedure, and its holding was not based
4
on the precedent of the time. In addition, the Restatement of Contracts,
most treatises, and a majority of other jurisdictions recognized that
5
evidence of fraud will be allowed despite the Parol Evidence Rule.
Another criticism was that Pendergrass provided drafting parties a
loophole to make misrepresentations and then disclaim them later in
6
writing. Thus, scholars were concerned that Pendergrass encouraged, or
at least tolerated, fraudulent practices.
Riverisland alleviates many of these concerns. First, the decision
recognizes the realities of everyday life: many people do not read or
understand the contracts that they sign. Second, Riverisland creates a
clear rule consistent with the language of section 1856. The rule is also
consistent with the intent of section 1856: to give recourse against a
drafting party’s fraudulent misrepresentations and, thus, discourage fraud.
Third, application of Riverisland will acknowledge the psychological
tendencies that play a role in an individual’s perception and decisionmaking.
People are generally optimistic when entering into agreements, tending
to look for evidence that supports their preexisting beliefs about
potential dealings while ignoring contradictory information. When a
drafting party presents a contract to the non-drafting party, the nondrafting party feels pressure to sign. Taking the time to read it line-byline, let alone asking to take the time to have a lawyer review it, feels

2. 291 P.3d 316, 325 (Cal. 2013).
3. See Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Justin Sweet,
Promissory Fraud and the Parol Evidence Rule, 49 Calif. L. Rev. 877, 887 (1961); see also Pac. State
Bank v. Greene, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 739, 750–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
4. Sweet, supra note 3, at 885.
5. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 214 (2012); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 530
(2012); 6 Peter Linzer, Corbin on Contracts § 25.20[A] (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 2010);
2 E. Allen Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 7.4 (3d ed. 2004); 2 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 33:17 (4th ed. 2012). See, e.g., Touche Ross, Ltd. v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721
(Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Pinnacle Peak Developers v. TRW Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1980); Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. Nat’l Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1939) (finding
that the plaintiff had been “induced to conclude an agreement by fraudulent concealment of existing
facts and by promises, implied if not expressed, made with no present intention of performing. In the
allegations of inducement we find no challenge to the terms of the contract impermissible under the
parol evidence rule”).
6. See Alicia W. Macklin, Note, The Fraud Exception to the Parol Evidence Rule: Necessary
Protection for Fraud Victims or Loophole for Clever Parties?, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 809, 810 (2009).
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uncomfortable for the non-drafting party because it shows distrust of the
drafting party.
The Riverisland standard favors non-drafting parties by shifting the
cost of contracting from non-drafting parties to the drafting parties.
Allowing parol evidence of alleged fraudulent promises presents a number
of problems for litigants. First, honestly made but erroneous claims from
non-drafting parties regarding prior statements from drafting parties now
have a greater chance of making it past the pleading stage. A non-drafter
might bring a claim truly believing that the drafter committed fraud when
she actually misremembers what occurred. Second, Riverisland encourages
intentionally fabricated claims. A party who is unhappy with her
agreement might attempt to void her contract by alleging that the drafting
party made fraudulent misrepresentations prior to signing the final writing.
Third, Riverisland could lead to unpredictable outcomes from triers of
fact who might be biased by evidence of alleged fraudulent promises.
Jurors come to trial with different backgrounds and beliefs that impact
their perceptions of subjective evidence offered by the parties and,
ultimately, their verdicts.
To balance the costs of contracting between the parties, meaningful
assent to the specific terms at issue should be required for a party to be
able to exclude evidence of prior fraudulent misrepresentations.
Meaningful assent could be accomplished by having a one-page summary
and disclaimer of the key terms of the contract. Similar to New York
decisional law, under which drafting parties can obtain meaningful assent
in the form of a signature next to specific disclaimers of prior
representations, drafting parties could specifically disclaim prior
representations regarding particular terms on this summary/disclaimer
page.
Part I of this Note examines the Parol Evidence Rule and its fraud
exception. Part II discusses Pendergrass and the reactions to and criticisms
of it. Part III summarizes the recent California Supreme Court Riverisland
decision. Part IV analyzes the implications of its holding compared to
Pendergrass’s holding and discusses the practical realities and behavioral
psychological implications of each. Finally, Part V discusses a possible
solution to some of the problems that Riverisland presents.

I. The Parol Evidence Rule and the Fraud Exception
The Parol Evidence Rule (the “PER”) is codified at section 1856 of
7
the California Code of Civil Procedure. The PER “prohibits the

7. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856 (West 2013) (“(a) Terms set forth in a writing intended by the
parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may
not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement.
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introduction of any extrinsic evidence (oral or written) to vary or add to
8
the terms of an integrated written instrument (a contract, deed, or will).”
Once the parties put their terms into a written contract, the writing
becomes the agreement and the final written terms of the contract
9
supersede any prior oral or written negotiations. As long as the nondrafting party has the general knowledge that a set of terms exists within
the contract, a court will likely find that party to have consented to the
10
agreement. Courts will usually find that a non-drafting party has given
11
such “blanket assent,” even if there is no evidence that the party
12
specifically assented to each individual term. Thus, the court will likely
find that a party that signs a written contract has agreed to the terms in
13
the contract, even if she does not know the specifics of those terms.
The PER bars evidence of prior writings and prior or
14
contemporaneous oral agreements. Under the PER, therefore, later-in15
time writings supersede any conflicting prior agreements, oral or written.
The PER is designed to protect the parties’ final understandings, intents,
16
and agreements that have been expressly recorded in a contract.

(b) The terms set forth in a writing described in subdivision (a) may be explained or supplemented by
evidence of consistent additional terms unless the writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the agreement. (c) The terms set forth in a writing described in
subdivision (a) may be explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage of trade or by course
of performance. (d) The court shall determine whether the writing is intended by the parties as a final
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein and whether the
writing is intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
(e) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in issue by the pleadings, this section does
not exclude evidence relevant to that issue. (f) Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in
dispute, this section does not exclude evidence relevant to that issue. (g) This section does not exclude
other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made or to which it relates, as
defined in Section 1860, or to explain an extrinsic ambiguity or otherwise interpret the terms of the
agreement, or to establish illegality or fraud. (h) As used in this section, the term agreement includes
deeds and wills, as well as contracts between parties.”). The corresponding section in the California
Civil Code is section 1625: “The execution of a contract in writing, whether the law requires it to be
written or not, supersedes all the negotiations or stipulations concerning its matter which preceded or
accompanied the execution of the instrument.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1625 (West 2013).
8. 2 B.E. Witkin, Cal. Evid. Documentary Evidence § 60, at 199 (5th ed. 2012).
9. Casa Herrera, Inc. v. Beydoun, 83 P.3d 497, 502 (Cal. 2004).
10. Russell Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law
and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 Calif. L. Rev. 51, 59 (2013).
11. Id.; Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals 370–71 (1960).
12. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age,
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 461 (2002) (“Despite criticism, Llewellyn’s notion of ‘blanket assent’ dominates
contemporary judicial treatment of standard-form provisions. ‘Blanket assent’ is best understood to mean
that, although consumers do not read standard terms, so long as their formal presentation and substance
are reasonable, consumers comprehend the existence of the terms and agree to be bound to them.”).
13. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 59.
14. Casa Herrera, 83 P.3d at 502–03.
15. Id.
16. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
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Consciously or subconsciously, parties generally intend for their later
17
agreements to supersede earlier discussed terms in their negotiations.
Thus, the PER makes sure that this final agreement is not subject to
18
change unless both parties agree to a modification.
One policy consideration underlying the PER is based on the
assumption that “written evidence is more accurate than human
19
memory.” Because the court will be interpreting written words instead of
alleged past discussion, this also provides predictability in how a court will
interpret a contract when there is disagreement between the parties. In
addition, without such a rule, courts and scholars fear that evidence of
intentional or unintentional fabrications by interested parties might
20
mislead jurors. The PER is designed to protect against such concerns.
In addition, a common law principle provides that parties have a
21
“duty to read” contracts that they sign. As the celebrated contracts
scholar and treatise author Arthur Corbin stated, a “party who signs an
instrument manifests assent to it and may not later complain about not
22
reading or not understanding the instrument.” Without a duty to read
and the existence of the PER, parties could simply avoid liability by
23
claiming not to have read or understood their contracts. This would lead
to written contracts that have virtually no meaning.
In determining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence, courts generally
24
undertake a multi-step process. First, the court must determine whether
the PER applies. To make this determination, the court considers
whether there was a final writing and whether the parties intended that
25
writing to be an integration —“a complete and final expression of the
26
parties’ agreement.” The PER only applies to an agreement that is
27
integrated. If the writing is a final integration, the PER bars any evidence
28
of collateral agreements. An integration might also be “partial” where
the parties intend the writing to be final but do not intend it to include all

17. Nicholas R. Weiskopf, Supplementing Written Agreements: Restating the Parol Evidence Rule
in Terms of Credibility and Relative Fault, 34 Emory L.J. 93, 94 (1985) (“[P]articipants in negotiations
typically intend, consciously or subliminally, to have a resulting written agreement, an ‘integration,’
evidence terms finally agreed to in discharge of those proposed, discussed, or tentatively assented to in
the dickering process.”).
18. See Casa Herrera, 83 P.3d at 503.
19. Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968).
20. See, e.g., id.; Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 Yale L.J. 603, 608 (1944).
21. See 7 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts §§ 28.38, 29.8, 29.12 (rev. ed. 2012).
22. Id. § 28.38.
23. See id. § 29.8.
24. Witkin, supra note 8, § 60, at 200.
25. Id.
26. Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal. Rptr. 870, 886 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
27. Shivers v. Liberty Bldg.-Loan Ass’n, 106 P.2d 4, 6 (Cal. 1940).
28. Banco Do Brasil, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
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29

the details of their agreement. If the writing is partially integrated, then
30
the PER applies only to the integrated part of the agreement.
Second, the court must determine whether the evidence is consistent
31
or inconsistent with the writing. If the extrinsic evidence constitutes a
consistent collateral agreement or is being used to interpret the terms of
32
the agreement, then the evidence is admissible. If the extrinsic evidence
33
is used to vary the terms of the final writing, then the evidence is barred.
Third, the court looks at whether the extrinsic inconsistent evidence
34
falls under one of the exceptions to the PER. Extrinsic evidence is
admissible when there is a mistake in the writing, when the validity of the
contract is in dispute, to interpret the terms of the writing, or to establish
35
illegality or fraud. This Note focuses on the fraud exception, which
includes actual or constructive fraud—intentional or reckless false
representations that induce a party’s reliance and cause economic
36
damages. Under section 1572 of the California Civil Code, “actual
fraud” consists of a false representation committed by a party to the
contract with the intent to deceive the other party about the agreement
37
or induce her to enter into it. Section 1572 lists a variety of fraudulent
acts including “[t]he suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one
who does not believe it to be true; . . . A promise made without any
38
intention of performing it; or, . . . Any other act fitted to deceive.”
Under section 1573 of the California Civil Code, “constructive fraud”
includes any breach of duty, without fraudulent intent, that misleads a
39
person to the other’s advantage.
When a party alleges fraud or illegality, California decisional law
permits evidence of pre-contractual misrepresentations that vary or
40
contradict the written agreement. Evidence of fraud is admissible even
if the contract contains a merger clause stating that the written document
29. Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club,
Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 505, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
30. Id.
31. Witkin, supra note 8, § 60, at 200.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856(e)–(g) (West 2012).
35. Id. § 1856(g).
36. Cal. Civ. Code § 1572 (West 2012) (defining “actual fraud”); id. § 1573 (defining “constructive
fraud”).
37. Id. § 1572.
38. Id. (emphasis added); see id. § 1710 (“A deceit . . . is either: (1) The suggestion, as a fact, of that
which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; (2) The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not
true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true; (3) The suppression of a fact, by
one who is bound to disclose it, or who gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead for
want of communication of that fact; or, (4) A promise, made without any intention of performing it.”).
39. Id. § 1573 (emphasis added).
40. Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1291 (9th Cir. 2006).
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41

embodies the entire agreement and any right to introduce prior oral
42
representations is waived.
The fraud exception can be justified in three ways. First, if fraud is
43
present, there cannot be mutual assent between the parties. Extrinsic
evidence of fraud does not vary the terms of the contract, but rather
44
shows that no legally binding contract was made in the first place. Thus,
because there was never a contact to begin with, the PER does not
45
apply. Second, as a practical matter, if a contract were voidable due to
46
fraud, the fraud would likely not appear in the actual written document.
Thus, the exception allows extrinsic evidence to prove fraud, even if
fraud cannot be found on the face of the contract. Third, parol evidence
of fraud is allowed because, otherwise, parties would be able to engage in
47
fraud or illegality without fear of repercussion. Parties may not use the
48
PER as a shield to commit fraudulent acts and escape liability. Despite
these policy considerations and the language in section 1856, which
specifically and broadly permits evidence of fraud, the California
49
Supreme Court in Pendergrass limited the fraud exception.

II. PENDERGRASS: Evidence of Promissory Fraud Inconsistent with
a Subsequent Writing Is Inadmissible Under the Parol Evidence
Rule
[T]o admit evidence of extrinsic agreements would be to open the door
to all evils that the parol evidence rule was designed to prevent.
50
—Judge P. Tyler

In 1935, Pendergrass limited the fraud exception to the PER and
held that evidence of promissory fraud that was inconsistent with the
51
written agreement was not allowed. In 1928, the defendant borrowers,
T.S. Pendergrass and his son, purchased a ranch subject to a $20,000 trust
52
deed from plaintiff Bank of America. In January 1932, the
53
Pendergrasses fell behind on their payments. They negotiated with the
41. Fleury v. Ramacciotti, 67 P.2d 339, 340 (Cal. 1937).
42. Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 789
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995); Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 345 (Cal. 1928).
43. Charles L. Knapp, Nathan M. Crystal & Harry G. Prince, Problems in Contract Law:
Cases and Materials 392 (6th ed. 2007).
44. Wiberg v. Barnum, 278 P. 871, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929).
45. Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 43, at 392.
46. Id.
47. See Macklin, supra note 6, at 810.
48. Halagan v. Ohanesian, 64 Cal. Rptr. 792, 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967).
49. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935).
50. Lindemann v. Coryell, 212 P. 47, 49 (Cal. 1922).
51. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662.
52. Id. at 660, 662.
53. Id. at 661.
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bank for a new demand note for $4750, secured by chattel and crop
54
mortgages and payable on demand. Soon after these documents were
55
executed, the bank demanded payment. When the Pendergrasses did
not pay, the bank seized all of the property covered by the mortgages
56
and sued to enforce the note.
The Pendergrasses raised two defenses in their answer: (1) the bank
could only enforce the note by judicial foreclosure because the note was
57
secured by a chattel mortgage, and (2) the note was obtained by fraud.
The Pendergrasses alleged that the bank had promised that they would
not interfere with their farming for the rest of the year and that the
defendants would not have to make any payments on their debt until the
1932 crop was ready for harvest because the proceeds from the crop
58
would constitute payment. The Pendergrasses asserted that the bank
made these promises fraudulently to obtain the new note and additional
59
collateral and never intended to follow through with them.
60
The trial judge directed the judgment for the bank. The district court
of appeal reversed because the Pendergrasses’ opening statement fixed a
pleading error regarding the note only being enforceable by judicial
61
foreclosure. Although unnecessary because the judgment was already
reversed, the court then addressed the Pendergrasses’ second claim of
62
promissory fraud, finding that it could be used as a defense.
The Supreme Court of California reversed the intermediate appellate
63
court decision regarding promissory fraud. The court considered whether
the promise by the bank not to collect payments until the Pendergrasses
64
sold their 1932 crop would be admissible evidence. The court also
65
analyzed whether such a fraudulent promise was subject to the PER. In
its analysis, the court relied on the Virginia case, Towner v. Lucas’
Executor, which stated: “It is reasoning in a circle, to argue that fraud is
made out, when it is shown by oral testimony that the obligee
contemporaneously with the execution of a bond, promised not to enforce

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 659–60.
58. Id. at 660.
59. Id. at 660–61.
60. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Assoc. v. Pendergrass, 35 P.2d 346, 346 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934).
61. Id. at 349.
62. Id.
63. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662.
64. Id. at 661.
65. Id. (“Is such a promise the subject of parol proof for the purpose of establishing fraud as a
defense to the action or by way of cancelling the note, assuming, of course, that it can be properly
coupled with proof that it was made without any intention of performing it?”).
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66

it.” The court in Towner argued that allowing such oral evidence would
nullify the PER, which was created, in part, to prevent non-drafting
parties from subsequently fabricating claims that the drafting party made
67
fraudulent prior misrepresentations.
68
The court also cited Lindemann v. Coryell. In Lindemann, the
court held that parol evidence of fraud could not be used when a person
“has it in his power to guard in advance against any and all consequences
of a subsequent change of conduct by the person with whom he is
69
dealing.” The Lindemann court stated that admitting such evidence
70
would negate the purpose of the PER.
The California Supreme Court concluded that parol evidence
offered to show fraud “must tend to establish some independent fact or
representation, some fraud in the procurement of the instrument, or
some breach of confidence concerning its use, and not a promise directly
71
at variance with the promise of the writing.” If the alleged oral promise
is inconsistent with the writing—even if the promise was made with
72
fraudulent intent—the evidence is inadmissible. When the party has it in
her power to read the contract, thereby guarding against any fraudulent
73
misrepresentations, she has the burden to do so. Allowing evidence of
any prior or contemporaneous promises that conflict with the writing
74
would negate the PER. Thus, although the court reversed on the judicial
foreclosure issue, it found that the evidence of promissory fraud
75
inconsistent with the writing should not be allowed.
A. Distinctions and Limitations: PENDERGRASS Explained
Courts and scholars have interpreted Pendergrass in a variety of
ways, finding numerous distinctions between the types of fraud and
limitations on what evidence is admissible. There are distinctions
between “promises” and “facts,” “fraud in the execution” and “fraud in
the inducement,” and “consistent” and “inconsistent” terms. Pendergrass
is a promissory fraud case (with inconsistent terms) or a fraud in the
inducement case. These distinctions are important to note because the
Riverisland court could have easily found the case to be one of fraud in
the execution and, therefore, did not need to overrule Pendergrass.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 705, 716 (Va. 1857).
Id.
Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662 (citing Lindemann v. Coryell, 212 P. 47, 48 (Cal. 1922)).
Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 49.
Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 661.
Id. at 662.
Lindemann, 212 P. at 48–49.
Towner v. Lucas’ Ex’r, 54 Va. (13 Gratt.) 705, 716 (Va. 1857).
Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 661.
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Promissory fraud is a promise that is made without the intent to
76
perform. Under Pendergrass, evidence of promissory fraud is not
admissible when it varies or contradicts the terms of the written
77
promise. The PER will not allow evidence of “D promised me X” when
78
the contract states that X will not be given. Evidence of promissory
fraud is admissible, however, if it is consistent with or independent of the
79
written promise. For example, in Simmons v. California Institute of
Technology, a written agreement stated the form of payment but did not
80
specify the money’s required use. The alleged fraudulent promise was
81
that the money was to be used exclusively for a specific type of research.
Thus, the written agreement dealt with the form of payment and the
promise dealt with the use of the money, which were two “wholly different
82
matters.” The court held that these representations were not at variance
83
with the writing but were independent of it and, therefore, admissible.
Misrepresentations of fact regarding a present existing fact or the
84
physical content of the written agreement are always admissible.
Misrepresentations of fact regarding a present existing fact would be
classic, actual fraud. This could include misrepresentations of fact during
85
negotiations. For example, a real estate broker representing that land
could be divided into two separate properties, when zoning laws actually
prohibited splitting the land, would be a misrepresentation of a present
86
existing fact.
Misrepresentation of fact regarding the physical content of the
written agreement occurs when a party knows the type of document that
she signed but the drafter said that the writing contained terms different
87
from those actually included. For example, misrepresentation occurs
when the non-drafter knows that she is signing a loan agreement but the
76. Cal. Civ. Code § 1572 (West 2012).
77. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 662; Macklin, supra note 6, at 816.
78. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996); see Korobkin, supra
note 10, at 68.
79. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d at 661; Macklin, supra note 6, at 816.
80. 209 P.2d 581, 587 (Cal. 1949).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr. 779, 798 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1989). The defendant in this case made various promises within its brochures while also making
factual representations. Id. For example, the defendant promised that“[u]nder crash loading
conditions, the main landing gear is designed to break away from the wing structure without rupturing
fuel lines or the integral wing fuel tank,” and that “[t]he [wing] support structure is designed to a higher
strength than the gear to prevent fuel tank rupture due to an accidental landing gear overload.” Id. The
court held that these were factual misrepresentations and, thus, admissible to show fraud. Id. at 799.
86. See Manderville v. PCG & S Group, Inc., 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 59, 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
87. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 68.
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terms in the document are materially different than what the drafting
88
loan officer had represented.
In addition, courts have distinguished between fraud in the execution
and fraud in the inducement. Fraud in the execution relates to the
establishment or inception of the agreement where a party is “deceived as
to the nature of his act”—either the party did not intend to enter into a
contract or does not know the nature and character of what she was
89
signing. For example, the drafter asks the non-drafter to sign what the
drafter says is a receipt for items delivered, but is actually a contract for
90
the sale of more items. The PER allows, and Pendergrass did not
prohibit, evidence of “D said that the contract promises X” when the
91
contract promises Y instead. In such a case, because there is no mutual
92
assent, there is no legal contract. Thus, the contract is void and subject
93
to rescission by the party that was deceived.
With fraud in the inducement, on the other hand, the party knows
the nature and character of what he is signing “but his consent is induced
94
by fraud.” For example, making a fraudulent statement that the roof on
a house had been repaired to get homebuyers to sign a contract would
constitute fraud in the inducement. In such cases, the parties mutually
assented and formed a contract, but it might be voidable by rescission
95
because of the fraud. However, under Pendergrass, the PER does not
allow evidence of “D promised me X” if X was not included in the
96
contract.
Finally, there is a distinction between “consistent” and “inconsistent”
terms. In Coast Bank v. Holmes, the bank sued the borrower to recover
97
the money owed on its promissory note. The borrower alleged that the
bank had orally promised (1) not to enforce the note, but to cancel it if the
parcel of land was foreclosed upon, (2) to only demand payment on the
note if the parcel was sold for enough money to enable the borrower to
98
pay off the note, and (3) to protect the borrower’s security interest. The
court ultimately held that the first two promises were inconsistent terms
88. See Pac. State Bank v. Greene, 1 Cal. Rptr. 739, 742–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
89. Ford v. Shearson Lehman Am. Express, Inc., 225 Cal. Rptr. 895, 904 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
90. Knapp, Crystal & Prince, supra note 43, at 392.
91. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 68.
92. Speck v. Wylie, 36 P.2d 618, 619 (Cal. 1934).
93. Edwards v. Centex Real Estate Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding
that evidence of fraud “is admissible in an action for rescission because it does not go to contradict the
terms of the parties’ integrated agreement, but to show instead that the purported instrument has no
legal effect”).
94. Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061, 1073 (Cal. 1996).
95. Id.
96. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935).
97. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971).
98. Id. at 34–35.
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and that the third promise was consistent with the terms of the note, but
100
the court was very critical of the “consistent-inconsistent” distinction.
The court noted that it is contradictory to have a rule that states that
promissory fraud can invalidate an agreement but then exclude evidence
of such fraud when the promise is at variance with the written terms of
101
the agreement. Given the numerous distinctions between the types of
fraud and limitations on admissible evidence, courts have interpreted and
applied Pendergrass in a variety of ways.
B. Mixed Reviews: Reactions to PENDERGRASS
Subsequent applications of Pendergrass have varied. Some courts
102
have followed the decision, some have stretched the meaning of what is
103
104
“consistent” within a writing, and some have simply ignored it.
Courts that have followed Pendergrass found that there are rational
105
policy reasons for limiting the fraud exception. For example, in Price v.
Wells Fargo Bank, the First District Court of Appeal noted that too
broad of a fraud exception would undermine the policy considerations of
106
the PER. An overbroad exception would possibly “allow parties to
litigate disputes over the meaning of contract terms armed with an
arsenal of tort remedies inappropriate to the resolution of commercial
107
disputes.” The court also noted, however, that favoring the policy
108
concerns of the PER compromised tort principles. The court concluded
that the Pendergrass court made a rational policy decision that should
99. Id. at 36 (“There was substantial evidence to support the court’s findings that the latter
promise, the prime bargained for assurance which induced Holmes to execute the note, was falsely
made. That the Bank had no intention of performing that promise when it made it may be inferred
from the failure to perform and from the dubious authority of a bank to make such a promise.”).
100. Id. at 35–36.
101. See id. at 36; see also Sweet, supra note 3, at 885.
102. See, e.g., Duncan v. McCaffrey Group, Inc., 133 Cal. Rptr. 3d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); West
v. Henderson, 278 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Banco Do Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., 285 Cal.
Rptr. 870 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Lamb Fin. Co., Inc., 3 Cal.
Rptr. 877 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960); Abbot v. Stevens, 284 P.2d 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955); Newmark v. H &
H Prod. Mfg. Co., 274 P.2d 702 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954).
103. See, e.g., Morris v. Harbor Boat Bldg. Co., 247 P.2d 589 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952); Simmons v. Cal.
Inst. of Tech., 209 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1949).
104. See, e.g., Chastain v. Belmont, 271 P.2d 498 (Cal. 1954); Willson v. Niagara Duplicator Co.,
198 P.2d 362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1948).
105. See, e.g., Price v. Wells Fargo Bank, 261 Cal. Rptr. 735, 746 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (“Moreover,
despite scholarly criticisms, the decision is based on an entirely defensible decision favoring the policy
considerations underlying the parol evidence over those supporting a fraud cause of action.”); Banco
Do Brasil, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 892 (“Over fifty years ago, our Supreme Court made a very defensible
policy choice which favored the considerations underlying the parol evidence rule over those
supporting a fraud cause of action.”).
106. Price, 261 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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only be reconsidered by the California Supreme Court. In Banco Do
Brasil, S.A. v. Latian, Inc., the Second District Court of Appeal agreed
with the reasoning in Price and even stated that Pendergrass made the
“better” policy choice of the two alternatives, favoring the PER over
110
favoring tort principles.
Some secondary sources have also agreed with Pendergrass’s
interpretation of the PER. For example, John Wigmore, a legal scholar
and expert in evidence, stated that a party’s intent not to perform a
111
promise should not be considered “fraudulent” as it relates to the PER.
Although critical of Pendergrass, a recent law review note by Alicia
Macklin of the University of Southern California Gould School of Law
112
favors the limiting of the PER’s fraud exception. In her note, Macklin
113
even advocates for a stricter promissory fraud rule. She argues that there
should be varying degrees of the fraud exception for certain contracts and
114
parties—e.g., more sophisticated parties versus less sophisticated parties.
However, Pendergrass has also received much criticism. The main
criticism is that the decision is inconsistent with California Code of Civil
115
Procedure section 1856, which broadly permits extrinsic evidence that
116
establishes illegality or fraud. The statute does not contemplate any
limitations or distinctions. Thus, it is inconsistent to have a rule that states
that promissory fraud can invalidate an agreement but then not allow
evidence of such fraud just because the promise varies from the written
117
terms of the contract.
Two years after Pendergrass, the California Supreme Court
118
completely ignored Pendergrass when it decided Fleury v. Ramacciotti.

109. Id
110. Banco Do Brasil, 285 Cal. Rptr. at 892.
111. Bank of Am. Trust & Sav. Ass’n v. Pendergrass, 48 P.2d 659, 662 (Cal. 1935). But see Sweet,
supra note 3, at 884 (arguing that the Pendergrass court might have been erroneously relying on
Wigmore because “Wigmore quoted the case to discredit a former Pennsylvania rule that it was fraud
to insist on a writing when there had been an earlier oral agreement to the contrary, a rule that is
almost universally rejected. He did not cite it to support his view that only evidence of factual fraud is
exempted from the parol evidence rule, although there was dicta to that effect in the case”).
112. Macklin, supra note 6, at 837.
113. Id. (“Instead of admitting evidence of alleged promissory fraud that is consistent with or
independent of the written agreement, courts should either follow the more strict PER standard for
complete integrations—barring evidence that varies from or adds to the written agreement—or follow
a ‘substantial variance’ test. While critics of the already narrow Pendergrass rule assert that the focus
needs to be on the ‘right to relief from fraud,’ fraud is a lesser concern for sophisticated parties, who
are in a position to protect themselves in a contract negotiation.”).
114. Id.
115. See Coast Bank v. Holmes, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Sweet, supra note 3, at
887; see also Pac. State Bank v. Greene, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d. 739, 750–51 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
116. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1856 (West 2013).
117. Coast Bank, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 35–36.
118. 67 P.2d 339 (Cal. 1937).
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In Fleury, the defendant defaulted on a note and the plaintiff let the
119
statute of limitations run on his potential action against the defendant.
120
The defendant then signed a renewal note. When the defendant again
defaulted, the plaintiff entered a deficiency judgment against the
121
defendant. The defendant alleged that he told the plaintiff—and the
plaintiff agreed—that the defendant would only sign a renewal note and
waive the statute of limitations if no deficiency judgment would be
122
entered against him. The defendant alleged that he did not read the
contract but signed relying on the plaintiff’s representations that it
123
included provisions that prevented a deficiency judgment against him.
The court stated that “fraud may always be shown to defeat the effect of
124
an agreement.” Thus, the court held that the PER did not bar evidence
of fraudulent misrepresentations regarding the content of the contract,
125
when those misrepresentations induced the party to sign the contract.
Therefore, the court reached the complete opposite result of
Pendergrass.
Notably, in 1977, the California Law Revision Commission did not
126
take Pendergrass into account when it modified the PER statute. The
Commission suggested that the Legislature review three cases in making
127
its decision about modifications to the rule; Pendergrass was not
included, and the Commission cited Coast Bank, which is very critical of
128
Pendergrass, in its discussion of the PER. The Legislature adopted the
Commission’s proposed revision and did not change the language of the
129
PER as it relates to the admissibility of extrinsic evidence of fraud.
In addition, most scholars in their treatises recognize that the PER
broadly allows evidence of fraud without a Pendergrass-like restriction.
Corbin, along with E. Allen Farnsworth and Samuel Williston, who were
also contracts scholars and treatise authors, did not put restrictions on
130
the admissibility of evidence of fraud. The Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 214 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 530

119. Id. at 339.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 340
125. Id.
126. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 321 (Cal. 2013).
127. Id.; see Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 446 P.2d 785 (Cal. 1968); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W.
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968); Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
128. Recommendation Relating to Parol Evidence Rule, in California Law Revision Commission
Annual Report 147, 148 (1977).
129. Id. at 152; see 1978 Cal. Stat. ch. 150, § 1.
130. Linzer, supra note 5, § 25.20[A]; Farnsworth, supra note 5, § 7.4; Lord, supra note 5,
§ 33:17.
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also do not put any limitations on the fraud exception. Finally, a
132
majority of other jurisdictions also allow parol evidence of fraud.

III. RIVERISLAND: Evidence of Promissory Fraud Is Always
Admissible
We respect the principle of stare decisis, but reconsideration of a
poorly reasoned opinion is nevertheless appropriate.
133
—Justice Corrigan

On January 14, 2013, the California Supreme Court overruled
Pendergrass in Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera
134
Production Credit Association. The PER now permits evidence of
promissory fraud that is at variance with the terms of the writing.
In Riverisland, plaintiffs Lance and Pamela Workman failed to
make a required payment on their loan to defendant Fresno-Madera
135
Production Credit Association (the “Credit Association”). In March
2007, the Workmans restructured their debt in an agreement with the
136
Credit Association. The written agreement stated that the loan would
be extended three months with eight of the Workmans’ properties as
137
collateral. The Workmans alleged, however, that when they met with
the Credit Association’s vice president before the agreement was signed,
he told them that the Credit Association would extend their loan by two
138
years for the additional collateral of two of the Workmans’ properties.
The Workmans claimed that when they signed the contract the vice
139
president again assured them of these terms. The Workmans stated
that they did not read the contract but signed the places where the vice
140
president had tabbed for signature. The Workmans initialed the pages
141
with the legal descriptions of each of the eight properties. The
Workmans failed to make the requisite payments and, in March 2008, the

131. Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 214 (2012); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 530
(2012).
132. See, e.g., Touche Ross, Ltd. v. Filipek, 778 P.2d 721 (Haw. Ct. App. 1989); Pinnacle Peak
Developers v. TRW Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 540 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Globe Steel Abrasive Co. v. Nat’l
Metal Abrasive Co., 101 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1939) (finding that the plaintiff had been “induced to
conclude an agreement by fraudulent concealment of existing facts and by promises, implied if not
expressed, made with no present intention of performing. In the allegations of inducement we find no
challenge to the terms of the contract impermissible under the parol evidence rule”).
133. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 322 (Cal. 2013).
134. Id. at 325.
135. Id. at 317.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 318.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 317.

M - LaRocca_13 (Do Not Delete)

February 2014]

1/29/2014 6:36 PM

REFLECTIONS ON RIVERISLAND

597
142

Credit Association recorded a notice of default. The Workmans
eventually repaid the loan, “but they had to sell their properties at
143
severely reduced prices.” After being repaid, the Credit Association
144
dismissed its foreclosure proceedings.
The Workmans then sued the Credit Association, seeking damages
145
In response to these
for negligent misrepresentation and fraud.
allegations, the Credit Association argued that the PER barred any
146
evidence of terms that contradicted the written agreement. The
Workmans argued that these misrepresentations fell under the fraud
147
exception to the PER.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the Credit
148
Association. Relying on Pendergrass, the trial court held that the fraud
exception did not include parol evidence that was inconsistent with the
149
written agreement.
The court of appeal reversed, holding that Pendergrass was limited
150
to promissory fraud cases. The appellate court reasoned that the alleged
false statements by the vice president were “factual misrepresentations”
about the contents of the contract and were thus beyond the scope of
151
Pendergrass. The California Supreme Court then granted the Credit
152
Association’s petition for review. In the Workmans’ brief, they argued
that the appellate court’s holding was correct: theirs was a case of fraud
153
in the execution and Pendergrass did not apply. Alternatively, the
Workmans argued that, if the court wanted to reconsider Pendergrass,
154
there were good reasons to overrule it.
The California Supreme Court began its analysis by looking at the
PER, finding that the language of section 1856 is “broad” and
155
“unqualified.” The court then discussed the reactions to and criticisms of
156
the ruling in Pendergrass. In reconsidering Pendergrass, the court

142. Id. at 318.
143. Reply Brief on the Merits at 5, Riverisland, 291 P.3d 316 (No. S190581), 2011 WL 5075465, at
*5.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
*6–7.
154.
155.
156.

Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 318.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Reply Brief on the Merits at 7, Riverisland, 291 P.3d 316 (No. S190581), 2011 WL 5075465, at
Id.
Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 319.
Id. at 320–22; see supra Part II.B.
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considered whether its limitation on the fraud exception was necessary to
157
serve the goals of the PER.
First, the court looked at the law at the time that Pendergrass was
158
decided. The court cited six California Supreme Court cases prior to
Pendergrass that held that PER, without qualification, allowed evidence
159
160
of fraud. The court also looked to the 1898 case Langley v. Rodriguez
and found that the broad fraud exception applied in promissory fraud
161
cases as well. The court noted that it confirmed this view of promissory
162
fraud in Fleury v. Ramacciotti. Thus, the court found that Pendergrass
163
was out of touch with California law.
Second, the court looked at the authority that the Pendergrass court
164
cited in its opinion. The court found that the authorities relied upon did
165
not support its decision. The court noted that Towner, the Virginia case
quoted in the opinion, was not a promissory fraud case, and the
166
California cases cited also did not consider the PER’s fraud exception.
The court stated that “Pendergrass was an aberration,” and held that its
167
limitation on the fraud exception to the PER was not justified. Thus,
Pendergrass was out of touch with California law, not based on relevant
168
precedent, and inconsistent with the terms of section 1856.
Finally, the court noted that the intent element of promissory fraud
required a showing from the plaintiffs that their reliance on the
169
defendant’s misrepresentation was reasonable. The court declined to
address this issue, as neither the trial court nor the appellate court
170
addressed it. The court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court,
holding that the PER does not bar evidence of fraudulent promises at
171
variance with the terms of the written agreement.

IV. Reflections on RIVERISLAND
[I]t was never intended that the parol evidence rule should be used as a
shield to prevent the proof of fraud.

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 322–23.
Id. at 323.
Id.
55 P. 406 (Cal. 1898).
Id.; see generally 55 P. 406 (Cal. 1898).
Id.; see generally Fleury v. Ramacciotti, 67 P.2d 339 (Cal. 1937).
Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 325.
Id.
Id.
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Was Pendergrass truly an “aberration”—so out of step with the law
that the California Supreme Court was waiting for an opportunity to
overturn its ruling? Possibly. The court could have easily found Riverisland
to be a case of fraud in the execution without disturbing Pendergrass.
However, overturning long-standing precedent is quite rare, especially in
a unanimous decision. This clear consensus might also seem somewhat
surprising considering the current makeup of the California Supreme
Court: six of the seven current Supreme Court Justices were appointed
by Republican Governors (Tani Cantil-Sakauye, Joyce Kennard, Marvin
Baxter, Kathryn Werdegar, Ming Chin, and Carol Corrigan), and one
was appointed by a Democrat (Goodwin Liu). Generally held notions
suggest that Republicans are “pro-business” and Democrats are looking
out more for “the little guy.” Thus, the makeup of the current California
Supreme Court would be expected to be “pro-business,” however, the
decision was more “pro-little-guy.” Perhaps, then, Riverisland was a
logical decision based on a mechanical application of the statutes, case
law, and scholarly analysis.
There might be unstated reasons for the court’s decision. Justin
Sweet of University of California Berkeley School of Law stated that
perhaps the court’s holding in Pendergrass was due to “the court’s fear,
engendered by the depression, that a contrary holding would enable
173
borrowers to evade their obligations.” A possible unstated reason for
the Riverisland decision could be based on the blame placed on banks for
174
the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. Many banks gave loans to
debtors that the banks knew could not afford them and then foreclosed
when the borrowers could not make the required payments. In
Riverisland, the bank modified the Workmans’ loan while allegedly
fraudulently misrepresenting the agreement, only to initiate foreclosure
proceedings on them a few months later. The Riverisland court might
have recognized, and not wanted to sanction, such fraudulent dealings.
Whatever the ultimate reason, Riverisland brings with it both problems
and positive effects.
A. Problems with Allowing Promissory Fraud that Contradicts
the Written Agreement
A verbal contract isn’t worth the paper it’s written on.

172. Ferguson v. Koch, 268 P. 342, 345 (Cal. 1928).
173. Sweet, supra note 3, at 893.
174. See generally Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Final Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of
the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States
(2011); Sewell Chan, Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 2011, at A1.
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Riverisland’s ruling, which allows parol evidence of fraudulent
statements that directly contradict the writing, appeals to our sense of
morals. A drafter that lies about the contents of a written agreement and
induces a non-drafter to sign it should not be able to escape liability.
Riverisland appears to be fair because this type of deceit is wrong, and
176
the law should discourage such practices.
On the other hand, Riverisland arguably favors non-drafting parties
by allowing them to introduce evidence that has not been memorialized
in a written agreement. Allowing parol evidence of such statements
presents a number of problems. Three main problems are:
(1) unintentional—honestly made but erroneous—false claims from nondrafters, (2) intentionally fabricated claims, and (3) unpredictable
outcomes from triers of fact.
1. Permits Unintentionally False Claims
People only see what they are prepared to see.
177
—Ralph Waldo Emerson

Claims might arise from genuine misunderstandings between the
parties or honestly made but false allegations. For example, a nondrafting party might bring a claim of promissory fraud, honestly thinking
that the drafting party misrepresented the terms of the contract, when, in
reality, the drafting party did no such thing. The mind is not flawless and
might remember events incorrectly.
People see things the way that they want—and the way that their
brains are trained—to see them. A “schema” is a mental shortcut based
178
on a quick analysis of past similarities to previous information.
“Memory shaping” is the idea that a schema shapes how information is
179
stored and also influences how it is retrieved from memory. A person’s

175. This quotation is attributed to Samuel Goldwyn, however, it is a misreporting of his actual
quotation: “His verbal contract is worth more than the paper it’s written on.” Paul F. Boller, Jr. &
John George, They Never Said It 42 (1989).
176. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 72.
177. Ralph Waldo Emerson, Emerson in His Journals 514 (1982).
178. Humans receive a lot of new information every day, and because of this, the brain creates
mental short cuts in attempt to remember it all. These short cuts help us categorize new experiences so
that our brain does not have to create a new “mental file folder” for every piece of new information.
Our minds scan the new experience for similarities to past events and knowledge. Then, the new
events get placed in an already created mental folder that correlates with the new data. These
categories that our brains create are called scripts and schemas—mental short-cuts based on a quick
analysis of similarities to previous information. This process is mostly unconscious and happens
quickly. A script is based on a person’s previous experiences and is the order in which they think
things occur. Sunwolf, Practical Jury Dynamics 124–25 (2004).
179. Id. at 130–31.
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mind is schema-consistent and does not easily remember details from a
180
different perspective. Perseverance and strengthening of schemas occur
as well-developed schemas resist change and become more powerful
181
over time. People also tend to forget inconsistencies, over-interpret
consistencies, and favor memories that are consistent with their
182
schemas.
A non-drafting party might remember certain statements as being in
her favor because she has bolstered them to be consistent with her
183
schema. Thus, even a non-drafting party with honest intentions can
make mistakes. After Riverisland, and given the effects of memory
shaping, permitting parol evidence of alleged misrepresentations might
increase the number of lawsuits that are not factually justified, and such
litigation can take years. For example, the Riverisland action began in
2008, the California Supreme Court gave its decision five years later in
2013, and the case is still active on remand.
2. Encourages Intentionally Fabricated Claims
Pendergrass implemented a duty-to-read rule, which barred
extrinsic statements from evidence, even if they might have been made
with fraudulent intent. Stewart Macaulay of University of Wisconsin Law
School notes that, when a court has a duty-to-read rule, “one senses that
the court is concerned with the likelihood of perjury and the difficulties
of adjudicating facts” because “[i]t is easy to make up a story about one’s
184
assumptions that are contradicted by a written contract.” For example,
the Seventh Circuit, in both Rissman v. Rissman and Carr v. CIGNA
Securities, Inc., acknowledged the concern regarding intentionally
185
fabricated claims. In Rissman, Judge Frank Easterbrook stated that a
non-reliance clause “ensures that both the transaction and any subsequent
litigation proceed on the basis of the parties’ writings, which are less
186
subject to the vagaries of memory and the risks of fabrication.” In Carr,
Judge Richard Posner stated that the written agreement controls over
180. See id. at 131.
181. Id.
182. Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Category Accessibility and Social Perception: Some
Implications for the Study of Person Memory and Interpersonal Judgments, 38 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychol. 841, 854–55 (1980). This is also known as the “self-serving bias.” Ward Farnsworth, The
Legal Regulation of Self-Serving Bias, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 567, 570 (2003).
183. See Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Memory plays tricks. Acting in
the best of faith, people may ‘remember’ things that never occurred but now serve their interests. Or
they may remember events with a change of emphasis or nuance that makes a substantial difference to
meaning.”); see also Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 131.
184. Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read—Business Run by IBM Machine,
the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 Vand. L. Rev. 1051, 1065 (1966).
185. Rissman, 213 F.3d at 384; Carr v. CIGNA Sec., Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996).
186. Rissman, 213 F.3d at 384.
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alleged inconsistent prior representations because, otherwise, “sellers
187
would have no protection against plausible liars and gullible jurors.” A
party that later becomes dissatisfied with the agreement might attempt to
void her contract by alleging that the drafting party made prior
misrepresentations. Under Riverisland, such evidence of alleged prior
188
statements is now allowed.
Riverisland changes Pendergrass’s more general rule—barring
evidence of promissory fraud that is made prior to and is inconsistent with
the written agreement—to a more case-by-case analysis in which such
evidence is admissible. Moving “from relatively general rules to case-by189
case standards” increases the involvement of triers of fact. If judges and
juries were always able to identify fabricated claims, this would not be a
problem because claimants would have less incentive to bring such
190
claims. “Defendants would know they would always prevail in litigation,
ensuring that plaintiffs bringing such claims would receive negative
payoffs. With this knowledge, few plaintiffs would bring such cases, and
191
plaintiffs’ lawyers working on a contingent-fee basis would avoid them.”
Because the trier of fact will not always be able to tell the real
claims from the fabricated ones, there will be error. Corbin stated that
192
the PER might have been based in part as a way to control the jury.
Corbin contended that some courts prohibited evidence that
contradicted the writing because such evidence was likely intentionally
or unintentionally false, and there was a fear that the jury would consider
193
it credible out of sympathy for “the little guy.” Charles McCormick of
University of Texas School of Law agreed and noted that the “average
jury will, other things being equal, lean strongly in favor of the side which
is threatened with possible injustice and certain hardship by the
194
enforcement of the writing.” Juries might be overly sympathetic to
non-drafting parties that they think were taken advantage of by the
195
drafting parties. Thus, some plaintiffs will have an incentive to make up
claims—now admissible under Riverisland—knowing that a sympathetic
jury will likely believe them.
Jurors might also be more sympathetic to the underdog given
current events and recent history. A lot of blame has been placed on

187. Carr, 95 F.3d at 547.
188. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 325 (2013).
189. Macaulay, supra note 184, at 1066.
190. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 72.
191. Id.
192. Corbin, supra note 20, at 608.
193. Id.
194. Charles T. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the
Jury, 41 Yale. L.J. 365, 366 (1931).
195. Id.
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196

banks for the subprime mortgage crisis. Although jurors generally vary
on whether they are pro-little-guy or pro-business, jurors might presently
be more sympathetic to the little-guy debtor given the country’s recent
recession. Whether or not the Credit Association made the alleged
misrepresentations in the Workmans’ case, jurors in other cases might be
inclined to believe that the non-drafting parties were taken advantage of
by the drafting parties because they do not want to sanction potentially
fraudulent dealings.
Furthermore, even if the truthful drafting party prevails, there is still
197
the high cost of litigation. Many parties will want to avoid litigation, as
it involves considerable time, money, and risk of an adverse judgment.
This gives leverage to the plaintiffs—including those who have
intentionally fabricated claims—to get the defendants to renegotiate the
198
terms of the agreement, rescind the contract, or settle. If the parties do
end up in court, however, they will face uncertain outcomes from juries.
3. Risks Unpredictable Outcomes From Juries
There is no such thing as an impartial jury because there are no
impartial people.
199
—Jon Stewart

Perception is ubiquitous as it relates to humans and, more
specifically, as it relates to jurors. Under a Pendergrass-like rule, a judge
would likely dismiss a claim or grant summary judgment against a party
that claimed prior fraudulent misrepresentations inconsistent with the
writing. In the case of the Workmans, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the Credit Association, holding that the fraud exception did
not include parol evidence that was inconsistent with the written
200
After Riverisland, decisions about alleged factual
agreement.
misrepresentations will be left to juries. Instead of relying on the written
word of a contract, evidence will now be “he said, she said” arguments for
the jury to decide who they deem believable.
In the courtroom, lawyers act as message senders and jurors act as
evidence receivers. There are numerous receiver-centered variables that
201
a juror holds when interpreting evidence presented at trial. Jurors
196. See generally supra note 174.
197. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 72.
198. See Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for Fraudulent
Inducement of Contract?, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 423, 468–69 (2009) (explaining that a holdup by a party
alleging fraud is a reason for the other party to want to have no-reliance clauses included and enforced
in its contracts).
199. Judy Brown, Joke Express: Instant Delivery of 1,424 Funny Bits from the Best
Comedians 136 (2007).
200. Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 318 (2013).
201. Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 119.
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perceive other people (witnesses, plaintiffs, defendants, and lawyers),
202
objects, and things through mental filters and “psychosocial-noises.”
These noises are the variables through which the receiver views the
message. Some of these noises include: prior experiences, beliefs, gender,
203
memory, physical attractiveness, race, and snap judgments. These
noises make up the “social perceptual lenses” through which each juror
204
will look at the trial and are the cause of many perceptual errors. All of
the evidence presented is filtered through the juror’s “socialized gender,
cultural values (including organizational, community, religious, or ethnic
cultures), and attribution-making processes (personal theories about
205
what causes a thing to happen).” Basically, what a juror hears gets
filtered and thus distorted through these noises, leaving a different
message than the lawyer actually sent.
After Riverisland, judges must permit parol evidence of alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations that directly contradicts the writing. Now,
instead of relying on the written word of the contract, courts will rely on
jurors—whose mental filters and psychosocial-noises could distort their
views of the evidence, not to mention their views of the plaintiffs,
defendants, lawyers, and witnesses. Academics have conducted a
substantial amount of research about the effects of these psychosocial
noises in the legal system. Physical attractiveness and race, two of the
most visible and obviously available traits of individuals, are examples of
206
psychosocial-noises that play a role in the courtroom. The effects of
physical attractiveness and race reside mostly on a subconscious level.
Most people would say that physical attractiveness is a superficial quality
207
and that it does not bias them in any way. Similarly, most people do not
consider themselves, or would not admit to being, racist. However, it
seems that people grossly underestimate the influence that physical
208
attractiveness and race have on them.
Physical attractiveness greatly affects “person perception”—how
individuals think about other people and how they judge others’ internal

202. Id. at 119–21.
203. See id. at 119.
204. Id. at 122.
205. Id. (emphasis omitted).
206. This research relies heavily on mock juries, as performing experimental research in actual
trials could have detrimental consequences to obtaining justice. This research, however, has its
limitation because much of it does not include the deliberation stage in the study.
207. Gordon L. Patzer, The Power and Paradox of Physical Attractiveness 44 (2006).
208. A major reason for this is because they are socialized biases originating from childhood. See
generally T.G. Power, K.A. Hildebrandt & H.E. Fitzgerald, Adults’ Responses to Infants Varying in
Facial Expression and Perceived Attractiveness, 5 Infant Behav. & Dev. 33 (1982). A major reason for
this is because they are socialized biases. Id.
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209

and external qualities. The “Physical Attractiveness Phenomena” is the
notion that, in general, physically attractive people receive more positive
210
responses than their less attractive counterparts. These subconscious
biases translate to the courtroom in both civil and criminal cases. In mock
civil trials, jurors gave physically attractive plaintiffs more favorable
211
judgments, including rewarding higher monetary damages, and, in
criminal settings, jurors gave more lenient sentences to physically
212
Another study suggests that, if physical
attractive defendants.
attractiveness was used in any way to commit the crime or fraudulent act,
213
being good-looking might be detrimental to the defendant.
In addition, many studies have considered the role of race in the
courtroom. Most people have implicit, unconscious preferences for their
214
own race. In his book, Blink, Malcolm Gladwell asserts that we have our
conscious attitudes—what we choose to believe and how we choose to
act—and our unconscious attitudes—our immediate, automatic
215
associations that we make without thinking. These unconscious attitudes
are largely based on past experiences, relationships with others, and the
216
media. In the legal context, a juror is more likely to find a defendant
217
civilly liable when the defendant is of a different race than the juror. A
218
juror is also likely to be more lenient on a defendant of her same race.
Physical attractiveness and race are just two examples of
psychosocial-noises that jurors bring to the courtroom that impact their
judgments and, ultimately, their verdicts. Each juror is unique, and all
jurors come to a trial with different backgrounds, beliefs, and expectations.
Riverisland is significant because jurors, with all of their biases, will now
decide the credibility of alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Judges will
no longer be able to exclude evidence of alleged prior misrepresentations
that is inconsistent with the writing. Riverisland moves us away from

209. See generally R. Tagiuri, Person Perception, in 2 Handbook of Social Psychology (G.
Lindzey & E. Aronson eds, 1954).
210. Patzer, supra note 207, at 20–21.
211. Id. at 275.
212. Id.
213. Harold Sigall & Nancy Ostrove, Beautiful but Dangerous: Effects of Offender Attractiveness
and Nature of the Crime on Juridic Judgment, 31 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol., 410, 410–13 (1975).
In the study, the defendant’s physical attractiveness was high, low, or unknown, and the crime was
either burglary or swindle. Id. Defendants of high physical attractiveness were given more lenient
punishments for burglary than their unattractive counterparts. Id. at 413. The reverse was true for
swindle—the less physically attractive defendants were given lesser punishments than the attractive
defendants. Id.
214. Malcolm Gladwell, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking 77–88 (2005).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Dennis J. Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science 191 (2012).
218. Id.
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relying on the written word of the contract bargained for by both parties
to allowing jurors, who likely cannot be impartial, to determine its
meaning and what happened. Furthermore, because each juror views the
trial differently and pays attention to what she deems important, an
219
“evidence gap” often occurs. The human mind cannot possibly remember
it all and remember it correctly.
B. Positive Effects of Allowing Promissory Fraud that
Contradicts the Written Agreement
There seems to be an easy fix for non-drafting parties to avoid being
taken advantage of: read the contract. However, the duty-to-read rule
came from bargaining practices of a different era “when the self-reliance
220
ethic was strong and standardized agreements were rare.” Times have
changed. Russell Korobkin of University of California, Los Angeles
School of Law asserts that implementing a “pure duty-to-read rule”
would not serve as an effective solution because it increases the direct
221
and indirect costs, and reduces the social value, of contracting. He
asserts that these costs arise due to the complexity of contracts,
confirmation and status quo biases, and the potential to undermine
222
trust. Korobkin states that this rule would require non-drafting parties
to painstakingly read contracts to protect themselves against exploiting
drafting parties, cause non-drafters to take substantial risks by not
223
reading their contracts, or cause them to avoid contracting all together.
He contends that each option reduces the social value of contracting, as
“the costs borne by nondrafting parties under a pure duty-to-read rule
would ultimately be shared by their contracting counterparts, to the
224
detriment of all concerned.” Riverisland recognizes some of Korobkin’s
concerns, as well as others.
1. Recognizes Reality: No One Reads and Fully Understands
Contracts
I read part of it all the way through.
225
—Samuel Goldwyn

219. Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 123 (“There’s a real gap between the evidence that was
presented at a trial and the evidence a juror perceives was presented at trial.”).
220. Perillo, supra note 21, § 29.12.
221. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 88.
222. Id. at 78–88.
223. Id. at 88.
224. Id.
225. See Boller & George, supra note 175, at 42 (attributing this quotation to Samuel Goldwyn;
however, he might not have actually said it).
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The Riverisland rule recognizes a reality of everyday life: many
people will not fully read a contract before signing it. In his article, which
is highly critical of Pendergrass, Sweet states that the “argument that a
party can protect himself by insisting on written promises shows a
226
remarkable lack of awareness of the facts of everyday commercial life.”
One study found that about 1 in 1000 people scrolls through the online
boilerplate contract when it is provided prior to accepting an online
227
agreement. The one-in-one-thousand reader spent a median time of
228
twenty-nine seconds “reading” the agreement. The median length of
229
the boilerplate agreements was about 1700 words. In twenty-nine
230
seconds, the average person can read only 150 words or less. Thus,
given the complicated legalese in these agreements and the time spent
231
reading them, readership of the contract is basically zero. As an
anecdotal example, in an experiment by a software developer, PC
Pitstop, the company put a clause in its user license agreement that
232
promised $1000 to anyone who read it. After four months and more
233
than 3000 downloads, someone finally wrote in.
In addition, the problem is not only reading the contract but also
understanding it. Contracts are often long, complex, and written in legalese.
Understanding the agreement might be time-consuming and difficult for
234
the average person. Fully understanding the contract might require
235
hiring a lawyer, which is, again, time-consuming, not to mention costly.
In Riverisland, the Workmans’ loan agreement was twenty-six
236
single-spaced pages. That is almost twice as long as this Note and likely
much more difficult to understand. In addition, the Workmans were
renegotiating their loan agreement. It is possible that they thought that
the only terms changing were the ones represented to them by the vice
president of the Credit Association and, thus, there was no need to review

226. Sweet, supra note 3, at 896.
227. Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics
Approach to Standard Form Contract 3 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Working Papers, Working Paper
No. 195, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/195.
228. Id. at 27.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 26 (explaining that the average reading rate is 250–300 words per minute).
231. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 647, 671 (2011).
232. Larry
Magid,
It
Pays
to
Read
License
Agreements,
PC
Pitstop,
http://pcpitstop.com/spycheck/eula.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
233. PC Pitstop sent that person a check for $1000. Id.
234. Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age,
77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 429, 446 (2002).
235. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 78.
236. Reply Brief on the Merits at 4, Riverisland Cold Storage, Inc. v. Fresno-Madera Prod. Credit
Ass’n, 291 P.3d 316, 321 (Cal. 2013) (No. S190581), 2011 WL 5075465, at *4.
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the document carefully. Although it might have been unreasonable for
them not to read such an important contract (or at least the terms
regarding the extension and additional collateral that they believed were
changing), it is a reality of everyday life that people, like the Workmans,
neglect to fully read and comprehend long, complex contracts.
2. Discourages Fraudulent Practices of Drafting Parties and
Recognizes Legislative Intent
Pendergrass’s holding left non-drafting parties vulnerable. Under
Pendergrass, a drafting party could make false representations and then
later disclaim them in the written agreement without consequence. After
Riverisland, non-drafting parties have more protection, or at least
recourse, against this practice. Because of potential liability, drafting
parties will be discouraged from making fraudulent statements.
Riverisland is also consistent with the language of section 1856,
which broadly permits parol evidence of fraud, because fraud invalidates
the agreement. As the court in Riverisland stated, “Pendergrass failed to
account for the fundamental principle that fraud undermines the
essential validity of the parties’ agreement. When fraud is proven, it
cannot be maintained that the parties freely entered into an agreement
237
reflecting a meeting of the minds.” Thus, as the Legislature intended,
any fraud voids a contract.
3. Acknowledges Psychological Tendencies
As previously discussed, people tend to look for evidence that
supports their preexisting understandings and fail to notice evidence that
238
does not. “Confirmation bias” is the psychological tendency to bolster
current beliefs by seeking out consistent information and ignoring
239
inconsistent information. Furthermore, people also tend to interpret
ambiguous information as consistent, rather than inconsistent, with prior
240
241
beliefs. This “selectivity of perception” is unavoidable.
Such selectivity creates a problem when a party reads over a
document after being told—by someone that they have no reason to
disbelieve—that the terms state one thing when they actually state
another. One study examined the confirmation bias in participants

237. Riverisland, 291 P.3d at 324.
238. See Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 105.
239. See Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises,
2 Rev. Gen. Psychol. 175, 175 (1998).
240. See id.
241. See Sunwolf, supra note 178, at 105.
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reviewing home-loan disclosure forms by tracking eye fixations.
Participants were randomly told their interest rate (e.g., 4%) or monthly
payment (e.g., $2000) for their loan but, were not told that the quoted
243
rate would only apply for a limited amount of time. If a confirmation
bias existed, participants would look for information that confirmed their
interest rate or monthly payment and not for information that would
244
disconfirm it—i.e., the information that the loan adjusts. The results
showed that 29% of those participants given the interest rate term and
33% of those given the monthly payment term showed confirmation biases
245
in their eye fixations. The percentages indicating confirmation bias
increased further to 42% and 48%, respectively, when experimenters tried
246
to engage the participants in conversation while they reviewed the forms.
In the case of the Workmans in Riverisland, they claimed not to
have read the contract before signing. However, even if they had, the
confirmation bias suggests that they would have tended to read the
contract as being consistent with the Credit Association’s
representations. Their prior beliefs from what the Credit Association had
told them might have caused them to overlook any change in the terms.
They might have confirmed their preexisting beliefs about the contract
and signed anyway. Thus, because a fraudulent promise would have
affected the Workmans’ reading of the contract, allowing evidence of the
promissory fraud would at least help counteract the negative
repercussions of having signed it.
In addition, when presented with a contract, people often feel
pressured to sign. By taking the time to read the contract carefully or
asking to have extended time so that an attorney can review it, the nondrafting party indicates that she does not completely trust the drafting
247
party. On the other hand, a non-drafting party signals trust by signing a
248
contract without reading it. Korobkin notes that most agreements are
not just one-time transactions, but involve post-contractual performance
249
on the part of one or both parties. In such circumstances, he notes that

242. Debra Pogrund Stark et al., Ineffective in Any Form: How Confirmation Bias and Distractions
Undermine Improved Home-Loan Disclosures, 122 Yale L.J. Online 377, 377 (2013),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/04/16/stark-choplin&leboeuf.html.
243. Id. at 381.
244. Id. at 382.
245. Id. at 387. This particular experiment used pre-2010 Department of Housing and Urban
Development form 1 (“HUD-1 forms”). In another experiment using 2010 HUD-1 forms, the results
showed that four percent of those participants told about the interest rate term and thirty-five percent
of those told about the monthly payment term showed confirmation biases in their eye fixations. Id.
246. Id. at 388.
247. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 83.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 84.
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“bonds of trust are likely to increase the chances that parties will engage
in cooperative behavior that both maximizes the value of the deal and
250
builds a basis for profitable cooperation in the future.”
In the Workmans’ case, they also might have felt a similar pressure
to sign the agreement without reading it because of their ongoing
relationship with the Credit Association. Because the Workmans were
renegotiating their preexisting loan, they likely felt that they already
understood most of the contract’s terms. Thus, the Workmans reading
the entire agreement carefully would have signaled distrust of the Credit
Association. The Workmans would also continue to work with the Credit
Association, as a loan agreement requires post-contractual performance,
and might have wanted to do future business with the Credit Association.
Thus, the Workmans had incentives to cooperate and continue fostering
a positive relationship.
Another cognitive bias is the “status quo bias,” which is an irrational
251
preference for the current state of affairs. Any change from a person’s
current position is perceived as a loss. As an example, most employees
do not to opt in to their employer’s 401(k) plan, but most employees do
252
not opt out if their enrollment is automatic.
In Riverisland, the Workmans had a preexisting loan agreement
with the Credit Association as part of their status quo. In working with
the Credit Association to restructure their loan agreement, the Credit
Association allegedly made misrepresentations about the agreement’s
terms. By the time the Workmans signed the loan modification, the
contract had become part of their status quo. Not signing would have
been perceived as a loss. Thus, if the drafting party makes favorable
representations and then disclaims them later in writing, it is more likely
that the non-drafting party will sign the contract because getting the deal
is already part of her status quo.
Finally, the “overconfidence effect” is a bias whereby a person’s
subjective confidence in her decisions is higher than her objective
253
accuracy. The overconfidence effect might also increase the force of
254
“escalating commitment.” “Escalation of commitment,” or the “sunk
cost fallacy,” occurs when people rationalize their increased investment
in a course of action based on their total prior investment, ignoring
250. Id.
251. Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1227, 1228–
29 (2003).
252. Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. Econ. 1149, 1150 (2001).
253. Gerry Pallier et al., The Role of Individual Differences in the Accuracy of Confidence
Judgments, 129 J. Gen. Psychol. 257, 258 (2002).
254. See Barry M. Staw, Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy: A Study of Escalating Commitment to a
Chosen Course of Action, 16 Organizational Behav. & Hum. Performance 27, 41–42 (1976).
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evidence that the cost now outweighs the anticipated benefit. When
threatened with foreclosure of one’s home, it is likely that a party would
be willing to do most anything to keep that from happening. It is also
likely that evidence of the risk or cost of saving one’s home might
actually outweigh the anticipated benefit.
In the case of Riverisland, the Workmans might have rationalized
renegotiating their loan with additional collateral, thinking that it was
necessary to save their home and that they would find a way to make the
payments. Whether the Credit Association told them that their new
agreement included two or eight properties as collateral, the
overconfidence effect suggests that they might have agreed to it either
way. However, if the Credit Association really did make favorable
representations and then disclaim them later in writing, the overconfident
Workmans might have overlooked the significance of the change, ignoring
the evidence that the cost now outweighed the anticipated benefit.

V. Balancing the Interests of Drafting and Non-Drafting
Parties
Pendergrass favored drafting parties. Riverisland now tips the scale
in favor of non-drafting parties. Drafters can either bear these risks and
costs (paying for occasional losses), try to mitigate them (sustaining
transaction costs in the process), or avoid them (not entering into
256
contracts). Any of these three options, however, creates an “implicit
257
tax on contracting.” Basically, the drafting party’s cost of contracting
has gone up while its value of contracting has gone down. It is difficult to
find a solution that does not compromise one party over the other. On
the one hand, it is important to encourage people to read and understand
their contracts. On the other hand, courts should not tolerate fraudulent
practices.
Some scholars have argued for use of a “sophisticatedunsophisticated” distinction because it takes into account the bargaining
258
power and experience of the respective parties. Sophisticated parties
would be bound by the terms of the written agreement and prohibited
259
from bringing in parol evidence. Unsophisticated parties, on the other
hand, would be permitted to bring in parol evidence to show that a

255. Id.
256. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 76.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1059–60 (Del. Ch.
2006); Macklin, supra note 6, at 833–36; Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License to
Deceive: Enforcing Contractual Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus.
617, 624 (2009).
259. Korobkin, supra note 10, at 91.
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drafting party made prior inconsistent promises. As Korobkin points
out, however, the problem with a sophisticated-unsophisticated
distinction is that it creates one rule for sophisticated parties and another
for unsophisticated parties, and no practical way to contract for
261
something else. He notes that even sophisticated parties can be taken
advantage of by a contract being inconsistent with prior
misrepresentations, and it sometimes works in an unsophisticated party’s
262
favor to be able to consent to certain disclaimers of terms.
New York decisional law provides a step in the right direction
toward a workable compromise by requiring meaningful assent in the
form of a signature next to specific disclaimers of prior representations.
In Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
made oral misrepresentations about the operating expenses and
263
profitability of the purchased building. The contract contained a specific
disclaimer, which stated that: (1) the seller had not made “any
representations as to the physical condition, rents, leases, expenses,
operation or any other matter or thing affecting or related to the aforesaid
premises,” (2) the purchaser “expressly acknowledges that no such
representations have been made,” and (3) the purchaser “acknowledges
264
that it has inspected the premises and agrees to take the premises ‘as is.’”
The court noted that a general merger clause would not bar evidence of
fraud, but this specific disclaimer destroyed the plaintiff’s allegations that
265
he relied on contrary oral representations. The court stated that the
plaintiff had “in the plainest language announced and stipulated that it is
not relying on any representations as to the very matter as to which it now
266
claims it was defrauded.” The court said that if the language used in this
case was not specific enough to avoid claims of fraudulent representations,
267
“then no language [could] accomplish that purpose.”
Building on New York’s requirement of specific disclaimer,
California courts should consider recognizing meaningful assent to the
terms of an agreement if the drafting party provides a one-page summary
of the key terms in the document and specific disclaimers of any prior
representations. Preferably, this summary page would be the first page of
the contract, be written in plain English, and require a signature. This
page would be beneficial to both non-drafting and drafting parties: it

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.

Id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 598 (N.Y. 1959).
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 600.
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would help non-drafting parties understand the major terms of their
contracts, and drafting parties could show that the non-drafter knew that
any prior representations regarding specific terms were being disclaimed.
This summary/disclaimer page should be short, simple, and specific.
First, the summary/disclaimer page should be short. Most people are
not willing to read entire standard form contracts that are long and full of
terms that deal with unlikely contingencies. One study asked students in
Bachelors and Masters degree programs whether they would read
268
various types of contracts. One of the scenarios tested was that of
269
opening up a bank account. Researchers found that ninety-two percent
of the respondents indicated that they would not read the entire contract,
while forty-seven percent said that they would read parts of it or skim it
270
prior to signing. This indicates that people are willing to spend some
time to try and understand their contracts but are less willing to read
them in their entirety. However, if a drafting party just asks the nondrafter to quickly initial or sign paragraphs that have been tabbed in a long
document, the non-drafter might still feel pressure to just sign without fully
271
reading those paragraphs. Therefore, instead of just calling a person’s
attention to specific areas of the document, drafting parties could have a
one-page summary of the crucial terms and disclaimers.
Second, the summary/disclaimer page should be simple. Mandated
disclosures or disclaimers regarding the terms of a contract often fail
272
because they are too complex and difficult to understand. The
summary/disclaimer page should be written in plain English so that the
non-drafting party can understand the main terms of the contract. One
study showed that borrowers better understood a simplified Truth in
273
Lending Act mortgage form compared to the mandated one. On
average, participants given the mandated disclosure form only answered
sixty-one percent of the questions about the loan terms correctly,
whereas those given the simplified prototype form answered eighty274
percent correctly. Simple information facilitates understanding.

268. Shmuel I. Becher & Esther Unger-Aviram, The Law of Standard Form Contracts: Misguided
Intuitions and Suggestions for Reconstruction, 8 DePaul Bus. & Com. L.J. 199, 209 (2010).
269. Id. at 210.
270. Id. at 213.
271. See Korobkin, supra note 10, at 95–96.
272. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 231, at 743 (suggesting that mandated disclosures
often fail because “length, complexity, and difficulty are the enemies of successful mandates. This
suggests that brief, simple, easy disclosures are at least preferable”).
273. James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure and Promise of Mandated Consumer
Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews and a Controlled Experiment with
Mortgage Borrowers, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers & Proc. 516, 518–19 (2010).
274. Id.
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Third, the summary/disclaimer page should be specific. Specificity
provides notice to the non-drafting party of the particular important
terms and disclaimers and protection to the drafting party against
admission of evidence of alleged prior misrepresentations inconsistent
with the writing. If the disclaimers are specific, like in Danann, then the
drafting party should be able to exclude evidence of alleged prior
misrepresentations. As stated in Danann, “[t]o hold otherwise would be to
say that it is impossible for two businessmen dealing at arm’s length to
agree that the buyer is not buying in reliance on any representations of the
275
seller as to a particular fact.”
The summary/disclaimer page would foster transparency. Placing
the critical information on one page would make it extremely easy for a
non-drafter to understand the critical terms and disclaimers of the
contract. At the same time, it would help protect drafters by prohibiting
potentially biasing evidence of alleged prior misrepresentations by a nondrafter. The summary/disclaimer page solution recognizes the reality that
people do not read long, complex contracts and holds parties
accountable for the agreements into which they freely enter. If a drafting
party includes such a page, California courts should find mutual assent as
to a contract’s terms and specific disclaimers and preclude evidence of
promissory fraud that is at variance with those terms.

Conclusion
The California Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Riverisland
overturned Pendergrass and, now, evidence of promissory fraud that is at
variance with the terms of the writing is admissible. The decision creates
a clear rule consistent with the language of section 1856. Its application is
beneficial given the fact that many people do not read or understand the
contracts that they sign and psychological biases play a role in perception
and decisionmaking. The precedent set by Riverisland, however, exposes
drafting parties to intentionally and unintentionally fabricated claims from
non-drafting parties. Drafting parties are also at risk of unpredictable
outcomes from juries who might be swayed by testimony of alleged
fraudulent promises.
Riverisland’s standard favors non-drafting parties and shifts the cost
of contracting from non-drafting parties to drafting parties. To protect
against promissory fraud claims, drafting parties could obtain meaningful
assent by having the non-drafting party sign the one page of the contract
that contains both a summary of its key terms and specific disclaimers of
any prior representations regarding those terms. At the same time, this

275. Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 157 N.E.2d 597, 600 (N.Y. 1959).
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summary/disclaimer page would aid non-drafting parties in
understanding the major terms of their contracts.
So what about the Workmans? Had there been such a one-page
summary/disclaimer, would they have read it and uncovered the alleged
fraudulent misrepresentations? Given the studies discussed supra that
suggest that most people are willing to take the time to skim an entire
contract before signing it, it seems likely that they would have taken the
time to read that one page. Had they done so, they most likely would have
discovered any inconsistencies. Perhaps the Credit Association might also
have been discouraged from even making any misrepresentations, had it
planned on including such a summary/disclaimer page. On the other hand,
what if the Credit Association did not make any misrepresentations and
it was the Workmans who made an intentional or unintentional false
claim? Then, the Credit Association would have been able to use the
summary/disclaimer page to preclude any representations specifically
disclaimed by the Workmans. In either scenario, the parties would have
avoided costly litigation.

